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Introduction
Data Safety and Monitoring Boards (DSMBs)1 were 
introduced in the 1960s to monitor data in clinical tri-
als to ensure subject safety. It was thought important 
that DSMB members be experts in the field(s) of inter-
est, but not otherwise involved in the study (e.g., spon-
sors and investigators) in order to maximize objectivity. 
Since then, the use of DSMBs has increased dramati-
cally,2 and their scope has expanded to include scien-
tific issues — in particular, to avoid bias that can result 
when trials are stopped early because of evidence that 
one treatment has greater efficacy or causes greater 
harm than another; or that no treatment is likely to do 
better than any other. 
Four principles guiding the operation of DSMBs 
were offered by Susan Ellenberg and her co-authors:3
Principle 1. The primary responsibilities of a DMC 
[DSMB] are to: (1) safeguard the interests of study 
patients; (2) preserve the integrity and credibility of 
the trial in order that future patients may be treated 
optimally; and (3) ensure that definitive and reliable 
results are available in a timely way to the medical 
community.
Principle 2. The DMC should have multidisci-
plinary representation, including physicians from rel-
evant medical specialties and biostatisticians. In many 
cases, other experts such as bioethicists, epidemiolo-
gists, and basic scientists should also be included.
Principle 3. The DMC should have membership 
limited to individuals free of apparent significant con-
flicts of interest, whether they are financial, intellec-
tual, professional, or regulatory in nature.
Principle 4. The DMC members should ideally be 
the only individuals to whom the data analysis center 
provides results on relative efficacy and safety of study 
treatments.
The first two principles are uncontroversial and 
widely accepted. Our discussion focuses on principles 3 
and 4. The third principle includes the proscription of 
investigators (those conducting the trial) from DSMB 
membership. The thought is that study integrity and 
credibility are compromised if individuals with appar-
ent conflicts of interest are in a position to determine, 
e.g., whether to stop a trial. Justification for the fourth 
principle is to minimize the risk of prejudging out-
comes based on unreliable results from limited data. 
The hope is to avoid declining accrual rates over time, 
inappropriate termination of the trial yielding equivo-
cal results, and final results at odds with prematurely 
published interim results.4 As to affecting recruitment, 
Robert Wells and colleagues5 noted,
 [I]t was felt that if the group that developed the 
study…knew about interim data as it accrued, they 
might question the validity of their initial impres-
sion that there were no important differences 
among the therapies under study [equipoise]. 
Patient accrual would then decrease because the 
clinicians involved would not offer the study to 
their patients. Instead they would pick the ‘best’ 
treatment as established by early data trends and 
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thus interfere with the eventual demonstration of 
the superiority of one therapy over another. 
There is limited evidence regarding how emerging 
data might influence recruitment, but Sarah Edwards 
and colleagues6 found, “Willingness to undergo ran-
domization drops as prospective participants are given 
more preliminary data and as they are made aware of 
any accumulating evidence of differential efficacy.” 
This evidence can be either in terms of the magni-
tude of the difference or the corresponding p-value. 
As magnitudes increase or p-values fall, there is less 
willingness to participate. This shows that individu-
als will assimilate preliminary information and take it 
into account in their decision making. 
The principles noted above have been widely 
accepted: DSMBs have been called a “growth indus-
try,”7 and recent Food and Drug Administration (FDA)8 
guidance extols the virtues of DSMBs. A full 34 pages 
are used to detail the structure and function of DSMBs 
and to emphasize the belief of the FDA that keeping 
interim results confidential removes serious threats 
to trial integrity. Citing the regulations, sponsors are 
to take appropriate measures to minimize bias, and 
this includes remaining ignorant of interim analyses 
of the data: “such knowledge can bias the outcome of 
the study by inappropriately influencing its continued 
conduct or the plan of analyses. Unblinded interim 
data and the results of comparative interim analyses, 
therefore, should generally not be accessible by any-
one other than DMC members or the statistician(s) 
performing these analyses and presenting them to the 
DMC.”
But even the most enthusiastic proponents do not 
claim that DSMBs are always needed, or that they be 
routinely employed. The following criteria were sug-
gested in determining the need for a DSMB:
 Is the trial intended to provide definitive (1) 
information about effectiveness and/or safety 
of a medical intervention?
 Are there prior data to suggest that the inter-(2) 
vention being studied has the potential to 
induce potentially unacceptable toxicity?
 Is the trial evaluating mortality or another (3) 
major endpoint, such that inferiority of one 
treatment arm has safety as well as effective-
ness implications?
 Would it be ethically important for the (4) 
trial to stop early if the primary question 
addressed has been definitively answered, 
even if secondary questions or complete 
safety information were not yet fully 
addressed?
A DSMB would likely be appropriate if two or more 
of the above criteria were met, and probably not war-
ranted if none were met.9 Our stance, on the contrary, 
is that DSMBs carry enough ethical baggage that their 
use should be considered only when benefits clearly 
outweigh the disadvantages to be detailed below. 
We make the further observation that, in the rare 
instances in which DSMB use is warranted, consent 
forms clearly spell out its existence, its function, and 
exactly what information will — and will not — be 
shared with subjects as the trial evolves. 
DSMB Disadvantages
Despite the popularity of DSMBs, questions have been 
raised about some of their functions, and it is the pur-
pose of this paper to summarize the opposing litera-
ture, and to further develop objections based on U.S. 
regulations. We do not argue for a complete elimina-
tion of the DSMB, but feel that enough issues will have 
been raised to question the popularity or “growth of 
the industry.” Again, as noted earlier, our discussion 
focuses on two issues regarding DSMBs: (1) exclud-
ing investigators from membership, and (2) keeping 
the accumulating data secret, i.e., not sharing interim 
results with participants, those considering partici-
pation, and the physicians responsible for the care of 
these individuals. We consider first the question of 
whether investigators should have a role in the moni-
toring process.
Principled Principal Investigators
We begin with a paper by Curtis Meinert10 that takes 
umbrage to the suggestion that investigators are espe-
cially vulnerable to unjustified enthusiasm (or pes-
simism) based on unreliable early trends in the data 
and need to be protected from themselves in this 
regard. Meinert put forth four conditions he consid-
ered necessary for adequate monitoring (timeliness, 
completeness, competency, and freedom), and argued 
that investigators “have the necessary training, skills, 
expertise, and information to enable them to perform 
in an informed and competent fashion.” He pointed 
out that investigators would be the ones who would be 
blamed, regardless of who actually did the monitor-
ing, should a trial be judged to have been too long or 
too short. He noted, “Investigators have a duty to halt 
or modify a trial if and when its ethical base, broadly 
referred to as clinical equipoise, has eroded. Implicit 
to the duty is the need to be informed of accumulating 
results of one’s own trial and of other related trials.” 
He thought further, “There is irony in that, in the case 
of trials where we experiment on human beings, those 
who do so cannot be ‘trusted’ to see the data they gen-
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erate while they so experiment,” and concluded, “the 
best safeguards against harm to subjects of research 
reside in informed and caring investigators answering 
to demanding and vigilant IRBs [Institutional Review 
Boards].” 
The problems encountered when investigators are 
not kept in the loop are further exacerbated when 
trial subjects are patients of the investigators. It is of 
special concern when those responsible for the care of 
the subjects in the trial are deprived of information 
that might help guide that care. Benjamin Freedman11 
thought that physicians had an obligation to obtain 
any and all information that might impact the care of 
their patients: 
 Although [DSMBs] are useful in keeping the con-
duct of a trial free of bias, they cannot resolve the 
investigators’ ethical difficulties. A clinician is not 
merely obligated to treat a patient on the basis of 
the information he or she currently has, but is also 
required to discover information that would be 
relevant to treatment decisions. If interim results 
would disturb equipoise, the investigators are 
obliged to gather and use that information. Their 
agreement to remain ignorant of preliminary 
results would, by definition, be an unethical agree-
ment, just as a failure to call up the laboratory to 
find out a patient’s test results is unethical. 
Should a patient/subject discover that her physician 
had failed to make every effort to acquire information 
that might be useful to guide her treatment, this would 
surely erode the physician-patient trust relationship. 
Serious damage to the image of the physician as a 
practicing, empathetic professional who is primar-
ily concerned with the patient as an individual could 
result. Spread of a skeptical view towards the medical 
research establishment would seriously undermine the 
entire research enterprise, especially research involv-
ing human subjects.
Samuel and Deborah Hellman agreed.12 They 
thought that physicians should eschew trials that 
attempted to restrict their access to data since “their 
ability to act in the patient’s best interests will be lim-
ited.” They continued, 
 [I]f physicians continue the randomization when 
they have a definite opinion about the efficacy 
of the experimental drug, they are not acting in 
accordance with the requirements of the doctor-
patient relationship. Furthermore, as their opinion 
becomes more firm, stopping the randomization 
may not be enough. Physicians may be ethically 
required to treat the patients formerly placed in 
the control group with the therapy that now seems 
probably effective.
They made these recommendations realizing the 
impact they would have on the study design. They 
looked to the development of other, less ethically prob-
lematic, experimental designs as an outcome clearly 
favored to abrogating the doctor-patient relationship. 
Indeed, they thought that “[p]hysicians can acquire 
knowledge through methods other than the random-
ized clinical trial. Such knowledge, acquired over time 
and less formally than that is required in a random-
ized clinical trial [RCT], may be of great value to a 
patient.” We applaud this focus on the patient and the 
notion that knowledge acquired outside of RCTs may 
be of value to the patient (and that not all knowledge 
acquired via the RCT necessarily has value). 
Richard Lilford and colleagues13 considered, “With-
holding…information that patients might find use-
ful is at best paternalistic, at worst authoritarian 
and arguably unnecessary.” They thought that while, 
often, “ignorance is perpetuated to stop potential par-
ticipants voting with their feet,” there are times when 
releasing interim information might in fact increase 
recruitment.14 Finally, they thought it ironic that while 
recent guidelines admonished investigators to keep 
up-to-date with the literature and modify the informa-
tion they give to patients accordingly, data from their 
own trial would nevertheless be kept secret. They con-
cluded that since the meaning of interim data will vary 
from person to person, decisions made on the basis of 
such data should be individual decisions — not made 
for the collective behind closed doors.  
The National Bioethics Advisory Commission 
(NBAC) recognized that “unless individual investi-
gators understand their ethical responsibilities no 
regulatory system will function properly” and quoted 
Henry Beecher, saying that “there is the more reliable 
safeguard provided by the presence of an intelligent, 
informed, conscientious, compassionate, responsible 
investigator.”15 Beecher believed in the significance 
of “a special relationship of trust between subject 
or patient and the investigator,” stating, “the best 
approach concerns the character, wisdom, experience, 
honesty, imaginativeness and sense of responsibility of 
the investigator who in all cases of doubt or where seri-
ous consequences might remotely occur, will call in his 
peers and get the benefit of their counsel.” This senti-
ment was echoed by Franz Ingelfinger:16 “The subject’s 
only real protection, the public as well as the medical 
profession must recognize, depends on the conscience 
and compassion of the investigator and his peers,” and 
by Charles Weijer and his co-authors17 who thought 
that “the best way to monitor protocol adherence is a 
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form of researcher self-regulation, with input from the 
IRB or from experts external to the institution.” 
We conclude this section by suggesting that more 
communication, not less as when one of the players 
does not share the information to which only he is 
privy, is the best protection for human subjects. Ken-
neth Goodman,18 focusing on IRBs’ responsibility to 
minimize risks, thought that, for longer-term trials 
at least, IRB members should be educated about sys-
tematic science19 and its use in protecting subjects. He 
thought that IRBs “should have better means of com-
municating among themselves, investigators, spon-
sors, data safety monitoring boards, and others, as 
appropriate, especially on multi-center trials,” because 
“what is clearer than ever is that high-quality review 
entails that subjects on trials will be informed of devel-
opments, new knowledge, and newly discovered risks 
that might affect their agreement to participate.” The 
difficulty and importance of this task all but mandates 
an “all hands on deck” approach. A spirit of openness 
is evident when other conflicts of interest of PIs are 
managed. PIs are not forbidden to direct a study in 
which they may have conflicts of interest; they are 
expected to disclose the details of the conflict so that 
an effective management strategy can be developed. 
Why there should be special rules for managing con-
flicts involving data is not apparent. 
Apartheid Data Monitoring
Our second concern is that information concerning 
early trends in the data is kept confidential by the 
DSMB. This information is not shared with sponsors, 
investigators, current and prospective trial partici-
pants, nor with those responsible for the clinical care 
of subjects. One of the “when appropriate” general 
requirements for informed consent (45 CFR 46.116(b)
(5)) reads, “A statement that significant new findings 
developed during the course of the research which 
may relate to the subject’s willingness to continue par-
ticipation will be provided to the subject.” One of the 
circumstances in which appropriateness seems espe-
cially transparent is an RCT in which outcome mea-
sures become available throughout the trial (and not 
just at the end). Here, preliminary trends, not reach-
ing usual — or conservatively adjusted — levels of 
significance may not dictate early termination of the 
trial, but may be of interest — and relevance — to both 
current participants and those considering participa-
tion. The general requirement quoted above applies 
to those already participating, but it seems clear that 
those considering participation are also entitled to up-
to-date information concerning the risks and possible 
benefits associated with the trial. 
The regulations also clearly state that consent forms 
may require updating on the basis of preliminary 
observations. One needs not only promise to provide 
information that may impact on subjects’ willingness 
to participate, but that information is to be provided 
formally, and in a timely manner. Mary Adams and 
Dennis Conrad20 quoted from an Office for Protection 
from Research Risks (OPRR) “Dear Colleague” letter 
regarding “substantive and meaningful” continuing 
review: 
 IRBs must evaluate the following: number of 
subjects accrued; a description of any adverse 
events or unanticipated problems involving risks 
to subjects or others; withdrawal of subjects from 
the research, or complaints about the research; a 
summary of any recent literature, findings, or other 
relevant information, especially information about 
risks associated with the research; and a copy of 
the current informed consent, containing accurate 
and complete information, including any signifi-
cant new findings that may relate to the subject’s 
willingness to continue participation. 
We suppose that one might quibble about the mean-
ing of “significant” here, but the word “statistically” is 
conspicuous by its absence, and the fact that this is a 
consent document seems to indicate that it be “sig-
nificant to the subject.” Less ambiguous are the words 
“accurate and complete.” Complete has got to mean 
that nothing has been left out. In any case, it is difficult 
to see how IRBs are to discharge this duty if they are 
not informed of the new findings, irrespective of “sig-
While current or potential participants may not have a legal right to 
interim trial results, withholding such results may deprive them of valuable 
information — information that might well influence their decision to 
participate, or continue participation, in the trial. 
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nificance.” The Office for Human Research Protection 
(OHRP) recently confirmed this long-standing policy. 
From (very) recent OHRP Guidance, when reviewing 
the current informed consent document(s), the IRB 
should ensure that any significant new findings that 
may relate to the subject’s willingness to continue par-
ticipation are provided to the subject in accordance 
with HHS regulations at 45 CFR 46.116(b)(5).21 
We have already reviewed Meinert’s concerns about 
not allowing investigators to serve on DSMBs. In two 
other papers, he questioned the wisdom of masked 
monitoring,22 and confronted the problem of bias:23 
“The risk of bias is nil (even if investigators see interim 
results) in masked trials where the masking is effec-
tive, and likely to be low (even in the absence of mask-
ing) with crisp treatment protocols and objective out-
come measures.” Here “masking” (or “blinding”) refers 
to subjects or investigators or both not being aware of 
treatment assignments. We note that “objective out-
come measures” should be the norm for studies that 
would even consider the use of a DSMB. The FDA 
guidelines are clear that studies involving symptom 
relief rarely warrant DSMBs; rather, more serious — 
and objective — outcomes like death or cancer recur-
rence are typical.
Apartheid data monitoring has implications beyond 
the regulations and bias. Wells and colleagues24 made 
a not very subtle suggestion that DSMB secrecy might 
constitute fraudulent behavior, noting that fraud is 
defined as “an intentional misrepresentation, con-
cealment or nondisclosure for the purpose of induc-
ing another to part with some valuable thing…or to 
surrender a legal right.” While current or potential 
participants may not have a legal right to interim trial 
results, withholding such results may deprive them of 
valuable information — information that might well 
influence their decision to participate, or continue 
participation, in the trial. 
Wells and colleagues then present some examples 
showing that while interim results may not reach lev-
els of significance calling for termination of the trial, 
these results would be compelling to “the reasonable 
man” trying to decide which of two treatments he 
prefers. Suppose that a clinical trial is well designed 
to compare two interventions, A and B. Assume that 
when 50% of the total number of patients have been 
seen, an interim analysis shows A is somewhat, but 
not significantly better than B with p = 0.10. Also sup-
pose there are no safety concerns, i.e., the side-effect 
profiles of A and B are similar. The DSMB would have 
no reason not to allow the study to continue. However, 
an individual contemplating randomization might be 
keenly interested in the fact that, given p = 0.10 for 
50% accrual, the relative risk of a patient getting infe-
rior treatment is 8,450 times higher if the patient is 
treated with B.25 
An example structured somewhat differently, and 
involving much smaller numbers than would be 
expected with 50% accrual, was given by Richard 
Royall.26 Suppose in a trial of A vs. B, four patients 
were given A, and three of the four had a successful 
(S) outcome. B was also given to four patients, and no 
successes were observed. The p-value (using Fisher’s 
exact test) is p = 0.143, which does not reach conven-
tional (and surely not more conservative, “corrected”) 
levels of significance. The trial would then continue, 
unchanged, the DSMB being the only ones aware of 
the results to date. However, making some reasonable 
assumptions about the probabilities of success for the 
two treatments and assuming that, initially, A and B 
are equally likely to be the better treatment (true equi-
poise), the data point strongly in the direction of treat-
ment A. In particular, if the probabilities of success for 
A and B differ, and if P(S), the probability of a success-
ful outcome, is 1.25 times higher for the more effective 
treatment, then, if we thought P(A better) = ½ before 
any data were collected, it is now true, given the data, 
that the odds that A is the better of the two treatments 
is 2:1. If we were considering participation in the trial, 
and knew that it was this likely that A were superior, 
we doubt that randomization would be an attractive 
option. 
The lesson to be learned from these examples is 
that there is a difference between the amount of evi-
dence required to attain statistical significance and 
that required to determine individual preference. As 
pointed out by Robert Veatch,27 “The standard used in 
rejecting a null hypothesis differs from the one used to 
make a forced choice between two treatment options.” 
Rejection of a null hypothesis requires that the prob-
ability of doing so erroneously is controlled at a sat-
isfactorily small level (often 5%); less impressive dif-
ferences suffice for deciding which of two treatments 
is currently preferred. A more elaborate discussion of 
the difference between “decisions” and “conclusions” 
was offered by John Tukey28 almost 50 years ago. This 
discussion deserves its own subsection.
Decisions and Conclusions
According to Tukey, decisions are associated with an 
“act for the present as if ” attitude. One attempts to do 
as well as possible in a specific situation — to choose 
wisely among available gambles. Conclusions, on the 
other hand, are established with careful regard of evi-
dence, but without regard to consequences of specific 
actions in specific circumstances. Conclusions are 
withheld until adequate evidence has accumulated. 
Subjects in trials face decisions: whether to participate 
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or continue participation. They need to decide now, 
and they want to do as good as they can for themselves 
when making the choice. They are interested in cur-
rent, accumulated data that are useful in helping them 
decide — to choose wisely among the available gam-
bles. Investigators, on the other hand, seeking conclu-
sions, are less interested in the accumulating data; 
they are content to let it accumulate to the point where 
adequate evidence permits a conclusion to be drawn. 
No one disputes the (societal) value of being able to 
reach a conclusion that would confidently guide clini-
cal practice, but to insist that this be achieved by dis-
advantaging subjects is an affront to the Helsinkian 
admonition: “Concern for the interests of the subject 
must always prevail over the interests of science and 
society.” As put by Veatch, “All would agree that it 
would be preferable to have more definitive data, but 
if a patient must be treated before such data become 
available, then both law and ethics require that the 
subject is told what the reasonable person would want 
to know, including the preliminary data trends.” The 
examples presented by Wells et al. and Royall clearly 
show statistical significance need not be achieved 
before early results would influence decisions. 
Veatch29 called this the “preliminary data problem,” 
and concluded that studies in which preliminary data 
were not disclosed “would fail to satisfy the autonomy 
component of the respect for persons principle.” This 
directs our attention to the Belmont troika: respect 
for autonomy would seem to require that the infor-
mation presented to prospective participants be what 
they would consider to be useful to them, and up-to-
date. Concern for the rights and welfare of subjects 
as expressed in beneficence implies that participants 
not be disadvantaged as a result of their participation, 
and it is difficult to see how risks to the subject will be 
minimized and/or benefits maximized by not reveal-
ing what happened to earlier or concurrently enrolled 
subjects. Justice suggests that those accepting any risks 
associated with participation are entitled to share in 
the benefits of the research, and it is not clear that one 
necessarily need wait until the trial ends to reap ben-
efits. Following this line of thought, Joseph Kadane30 
suggested two principles to guide what a clinical trial 
should offer the subject: (1) whatever benefits the sub-
ject might reasonably be able to obtain outside the 
trial, and (2) share or use information developed 
during the course of the trial for the benefit of 
the subject. One way in which accumulating 
data might benefit participants would be to let 
them know about it, but there are other possi-
bilities. Kadane did not share the results with 
subjects, but he used accumulating data to their 
benefit by restricting the treatment options that 
a particular subject might receive based on that 
subject’s characteristics. 
A more recent discourse on the decision/con-
clusion distinction was given by Deborah Hell-
man.31 She started with the notion that, given a set of 
data, D, we can ask three questions:
What does the evidence (D) show?(1) 
Given this evidence, what should I believe?(2) 
Given this evidence, what should I do?(3) 
Only the answer to the first question depends on the 
data alone. What one believes and what one does will 
depend on the data, but also on other factors: back-
ground information not present in the data. In any 
particular application, the answers to the three ques-
tions may appear at odds with one another. Suppose 
the data, the results of a diagnostic test, indicate that 
a disease is present. One might still believe that the 
disease is not present if the disease is extremely rare 
and the test has a relatively large false-positive rate. 
And, one might still reasonably choose to be treated 
for the disease if the disease is debilitating and the 
cost of treatment small. She thus argued that there is 
a distinction between criteria for justified belief and 
criteria for reasonable action; in particular, that the 
epistemic standard required to believe that A is bet-
ter than B is much more difficult to meet than that 
to form a preference about the best treatment option 
for a particular patient. Participants (or potential 
participants) in a trial are concerned with what they 
should do; trial investigators and sponsors want to 
know what to believe about the relative merits of the 
treatments. Less data are required to guide the deci-
sion than to firmly establish belief. Hellman put the 
argument as follows. Equipoise involves beliefs: one 
is in equipoise because one is unsure, given the evi-
dence, what one should believe. For clinicians and for 
patients, however, the most important question is not, 
“What should I believe?” but “What should I do?” That 
there is uncertainty of belief does not mean that there 
is or should be uncertainty about how to act.
DSMBs should be employed only in rare 
circumstances and charged, first and 
foremost, with the protection of human 
subjects in accordance with ethical 
principles and to the satisfaction of IRBs.
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Fred Gifford32 used slightly different terminology, 
but studied what he called the important “difference 
between (1) the amount of evidence that would be suf-
ficient to warrant a preference for treatment A over 
treatment B for a given present patient right in front 
of you (the ‘present patient’ decision), and (2) the 
amount of evidence that would be sufficient to war-
rant the policy decision about how to treat not just 
this next patient but many future patients as well; that 
is, to stop the trial, announce the results, approve the 
drug, etc (the ‘policy’ decision).” He argued that the 
second decision (what we have been calling a “con-
clusion”) required more evidence than the first since 
more was at stake. The consequences of being wrong 
would be of more moral impact, since it would affect 
greater numbers of people. 
An even more recent discussion, again focusing on 
equipoise, distinguished between action-aims and 
outcome-aims.33 One has an action-aim insofar as one 
is disposed to do (now) what is best for her (present) 
patients; and an outcome-aim insofar as one is dis-
posed to try (now) to bring about that she do (for the 
rest of her career) the best for her (present and future) 
patients. Winston Chiong argues that the existence of 
two different aims need not reflect two separate activi-
ties governed by different norms; rather they reflect 
a single activity in which the two aims constrain one 
another. Patient care is an activity encompassing both 
the care of current patients and those to be cared for 
in the future. Rather than advocating an absolute-
priority view, he suggests a limited-priority position 
in which physicians give “somewhat greater weight” 
to the interests of current patients. This is based on 
a Kantian universalizability test in which one asks if 
we could reasonably want all physicians to act in a 
given way? If always, in all contexts, physicians gave 
absolute priority to their current patient, then medical 
education (students, while learning, are not at their 
“best”) and clinical research (involving such things as 
placebos, blinding, and “unnecessary tests” to assess 
efficacy) would be impossible. A middle road seems 
preferable.
In the research context, the question, “What com-
promises in the care offered to subjects in a clinical 
trial can be justified by potential benefits to third par-
ties?” is considered by asking what will it cost the cur-
rent subject if the balance is shifted towards the third 
party. This is context-dependent and requires judg-
ment.34 In our application, it is necessary to ascertain 
how much risks will be increased and/or autonomy 
diminished if interim results are kept secret. This will 
depend on the particulars of the trial.
So, What’s an IRB to Do?
We suggest that how best to monitor RCTs will not have 
a single, unique, time-invariant answer. This follows 
from the fact that the problem is political in nature, 
and the political road moves in directions determined 
by continuing discussion, debate, and compromise. 
This was noted by Paul Meier,35 who, after detailing 
some of the statistical problems in monitoring, said, 
“It is clear that, although statistics has a role, the ethi-
cal problem of continuing or stopping an experiment 
is not primarily statistical. Neither is it a medical prob-
lem or a legal one. It is, in fact, a political problem…
what sort of a society we wish to live in. How do we 
wish to deal with our fellows, and to be dealt with by 
them.” The “right way to deal” will vary from trial to 
trial, from IRB to IRB, and even, for a given IRB and 
trial, there may be variability over time. We can there-
fore only offer some signposts along the way.
Robert Amdur36 suggested that IRBs confront the 
question of whether a DSMB should be employed 
right up front. He cites guidelines stating, “At the time 
of initial review, the IRB should determine whether 
a [DSMB] is required, and should also set a date for 
reevaluating the research.” He points out that federal 
guidance does not establish criteria for determining 
when a DSMB should be used. He does, however, 
suggest, “Do not require a DSMB if it is reasonable 
to accept an alternative option…. The IRB should 
require a DSMB only in those situations where there 
is no other reasonable alternative.” We concur. DSMBs 
should be employed only in rare circumstances and 
charged, first and foremost, with the protection of 
human subjects in accordance with ethical principles 
and to the satisfaction of IRBs.
There is no question that IRBs have a considerable 
say in these matters. The FDA guidance cited above 
stated that the IRB is entitled to know all it needs to 
know about a DSMB in order to do its job of protecting 
the rights and welfare of participants. To determine 
whether risks to subjects are minimized, “an IRB may 
appropriately request information about the approach 
to trial monitoring, including the basis for early ter-
mination…an IRB may appropriately inquire as to 
whether a DMC has been established and, if so, seek 
information about its scope and composition.” Mein-
ert added, “IRBs hold the trump cards, if they care to 
use them, when it comes to who monitors and how it is 
done.” These “trump cards” give IRBs the ultimate say 
in that they need not — should not — approve projects 
with deficient plans for monitoring. 
We continue with a discussion of what needs to be 
done if we are in one of the (rare) situations in which 
the IRB allows the use of a DSMB. Assuming that the 
use of a DSMB is appropriate in a given situation, we 
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suggest that information concerning the existence 
and functioning of this body should be included in the 
consent form.
Informed Consent
Every IRB member worth her salt is able to mouth the 
anthem, “informed consent is a process.” As noted by 
David Wendler and Jonathan Rackoff,37 “Many com-
mentators have argued that informed consent should 
not be a single event at which subjects are informed 
and their consent obtained, but rather a process that 
continues for the duration of subjects’ research par-
ticipation.” The basic idea is that, as time goes by, 
changes may occur in the nature of the research (risks, 
benefits, alternatives, even aims of the study), and/
or in subjects (medical status, interests, and prefer-
ences). If consent is truly a process, then, such changes 
would be communicated so that continuing partici-
pation remains informed. It may be argued that, at 
least in some cases, subjects might consent initially to 
continue participation in the face of certain specified 
possible changes. Pointing to possible alternative sce-
narios for the research process may enhance subjects’ 
understanding of the research, but they should not 
be expected to assess exactly how they would react to 
hypothetical changes in the plan: instead, they should 
be allowed to change their minds. This follows directly 
from the Belmont principle of autonomy, and is one 
of the general requirements for informed consent (45 
CFR 46.116(8)): “A statement that participation is vol-
untary, refusal to participate will involve no penalty or 
loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise enti-
tled, and the subject may discontinue participation at 
any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which 
the subject is otherwise entitled.” This is federal law.
Even those who argue that, at least under certain 
conditions, it is ethical to keep interim findings of 
RCTs confidential, recognize that this is contrary 
to the regulations. Franklin Miller and David Wen-
dler38 admit, “Confidential data monitoring withholds 
potentially material information from patients invited 
to enroll in RCTs and thus conflicts with current stan-
dards for informed consent which require disclosure 
of all potentially material information.” Nevertheless, 
they argue that “an exception should be recognized to 
existing guidance on informed consent in clinical trials 
to explicitly permit withholding potentially material 
interim findings, subject to review by data monitoring 
committees, and to require disclosure of this practice 
to potential participants.” Informed consent is seen to 
be critical to the possible ethical withholding of results 
as they accumulate. Tom Beauchamp and James Chil-
dress39 put it this way: “As a rule, information about 
trends is not released prior to the completion or early 
termination of the RCT.  This rule is justifiable if and 
only if prospective subjects understand and accept it 
as a condition for participating in the RCT.”
 However, despite the lip service paid to the pro-
cess of informed consent, consent forms used in most 
studies employing DSMBs are less than forthcom-
ing about the way in which the process might work. 
Arthur Slutsky and James Lavery40 noted, “An expla-
nation of the decision-making process of the DSMB 
and its potential implications for research subjects is 
currently not built into the informed-consent process 
in most trials.” They propose that when a DSMB is 
involved, 
 prospective subjects should be informed about the 
board and told that any recommendation it makes 
to continue the trial, rather than stop it in the face 
of evidence suggestive of important differences in 
effectiveness among the treatments, might prolong 
exposure to a therapy that could turn out to be 
suboptimal or even harmful and could delay their 
access to an intervention that could ultimately 
prove to be more effective. 
Stephen Cannistra41 added that consent forms should 
“explicitly state the criteria to be used for early study 
closure, thereby permitting the patient to make an 
informed decision regarding study participation.” 
Jerry Menikoff42 recently revisited these issues and 
found no improvement. He focused on “an example of 
what is clearly one of the best consent forms currently 
being used,” one developed by a group of experts pur-
Where the use of a DSMB is either required, or can be justified in 
some other way, consent forms should be explicit about the existence 
and functions of the DSMB, including clear statements concerning the 
confidentiality of the accumulating data.
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posefully assembled by the National Cancer Institute 
(NCI) to study how consent forms should be written 
for cancer studies. The consent form, reproduced in its 
entirety on pages 105-112 of his book, contains the fol-
lowing statements concerning the DSMB (page110):
 A Data Safety and Monitoring Board, an indepen-
dent group of experts, will be reviewing the data 
from this research throughout the study. We will 
tell you about new information from this board or 
other studies that may affect your health, welfare, 
or willingness to stay on this study.
Menikoff notes:
 
 Not only does this language not provide the warn-
ing that would make this practice ethical [a warn-
ing that new information will not be shared], but 
it appears to do just the opposite: to affirmatively 
commit the researchers to disclosing interim 
results that, if patients knew about them, might 
affect their willingness to be in the study…. Thus 
the consent form appears to actively deceive the 
subjects, incorrectly reassuring them of something 
(being told of interim results) that will in fact usu-
ally not occur…. 
He concludes:
 
 Not giving them information that they would 
want under conditions where we acknowledge 
that there is a special duty to make sure consent 
is truly informed smacks of hypocrisy. In point of 
fact, failing to disclose information in the face of a 
clear duty to do so, with the intent to have a [sic] 
subjects enroll when they might otherwise not 
have done so, deserves an appropriate label: this is 
fraud, plain and simple. 
While between the covers of Menikoff ’s book, we should 
follow his lead in pointing out that consent forms often 
do not accurately portray what is known (or strongly 
suspected) about experimental treatments; in particu-
lar, there is often a mismatch between what is stated 
in the study protocol (to be read by potential investi-
gators and sponsors) and what is stated in the con-
sent form (to be read by potential study participants). 
He gives an example in which the protocol stated that 
“pilot data…strongly suggest the possibility that some 
combination of chemotherapy and radiation therapy 
will have a significant impact on the surgical mor-
bidity common encountered in managing head and 
neck neoplasms.” In contrast, the consent form stated, 
“[S]urgery and/or radiation therapy are the standard 
treatments” and “other treatments are considered 
experimental.”43 See also Veatch, who himself had a 
very hard time in obtaining a copy of the protocol for a 
study he was considering participation in.44
It seems clear, then, that the consent form should be 
more forthcoming about what the DSMB will and will 
not do about the results as they accumulate. Robert 
Levine45 indicated over 20 years ago how this might 
be done: 
 I suggest that we should go on to say [to some-
one considering enrolling in the study] that with 
time there will be increasing clarity that, e.g., A 
is superior to B. This superiority could manifest 
as a decreased probability of serious harms or an 
increased probability of benefits. However, for good 
reasons, we have designed the [study] so that nei-
ther the investigator nor the subject will be aware 
of this disparity until such time as the arbitrarily 
preselected criteria of significance are achieved. 
Thus, what I would ask the subject to consent to 
is an acceptance of the standards of proof agreed 
upon within the community of professionals.46
A somewhat less blunt statement of what effects the 
DSMB’s actions might have is given by David Buch-
anan and Franklin Miller47 who suggest the wording: 
 This study is designed to determine whether 
patients with your condition who receive the study 
drug will have a reduced rate of new or recurrent 
experiences of the condition of at least 5 percent 
over a four-year period, compared to those who 
receive standard treatment. An independent Data 
and Safety Monitoring Board will review informa-
tion concerning the effectiveness of the study drug 
at regular intervals during the study. The DSMB 
will stop the study immediately if evidence indi-
cates that subjects in either study group have a 
higher rate of death [or “stop the study if there is 
firm evidence that the reduction in disease occur-
rence is greater than 5 percent” or “stop the study if 
there is an unacceptably large difference in rates of 
the targeted condition.”] 
Summary and Conclusions 
The main thrust of this paper has been to call into 
question the unchecked growth of the “DSMB indus-
try.” While recognizing that DSMBs may offer certain 
scientific advantages in some cases, we have argued 
that the small (scientific) gains that might be realized 
are accompanied by unacceptable (ethical) costs. As 
noted by Beauchamp and Childress, the ethical prob-
lems inherent in the practice of withholding informa-
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tion from participants do not “disappear” when one 
uses a DSMB. They state, 
 This differentiation of roles by using a monitoring 
committee, particularly in a double-blind RCT, is 
procedurally sound, but it relocates rather than 
resolves some central ethical questions. The com-
mittee must still determine when, if ever, it is legit-
imate to impose risks on current patients in order 
to benefit future ones by establishing with a high 
degree of certainty the superiority of one treatment 
over another or over a placebo. A committee will 
likely take the perspective that clinical equipoise 
must have been eliminated from the perspective of 
the expert medical community. However, the indi-
vidual physician and his or her patient may be con-
cerned primarily with whether clinical uncertainty 
has been eliminated for them. 
We call for decelerated use of DSMBs and a careful 
re-examination of the issues raised in this paper so 
that we may be able to develop more “participant-
friendly” guidelines for how best to use accumulating 
data in clinical trials. In the short term, however, we 
recognize that DSMBs will not completely disappear, 
their use even being required in certain situations. We 
would hope that in those situations where the use of a 
DSMB is either required, or can be justified in some 
other way, consent forms should be explicit about the 
existence and functions of the DSMB, including clear 
statements concerning the confidentiality of the accu-
mulating data.
Finally, we have pointed to the pivotal role played 
by the principal investigator in clinical trials. No one 
knows more about the trial than the primary investi-
gator (PI), who is uniquely positioned to interpret the 
data he or she is collecting for the purposes he or she 
has set forth. To usurp the power of the PI to evaluate 
the data as they accumulate is to “shoot oneself in the 
foot,” and, importantly, will serve to further alienate 
PIs from the “regulatory police.” 
DSMBs do not write (or update) consent forms; 
investigators do. Nor do DSMBs approve consent 
forms; IRBs do. It is difficult to see how we can expect 
consent forms to be accurate, complete, and up-to-
date when the PI and IRB are deprived of the infor-
mation needed to produce them. Blaming the PI for 
not producing the best consent form possible (and we 
believe potential subjects deserve this) under these 
conditions violates the oft-heard ethical maxim “ought 
implies can.” The consent process is widely recognized 
to be the cornerstone of ethical research. If potential 
subjects do not trust the PI to be entirely forthcom-
ing during this process, then we risk alienating society 
from the research process itself, an outcome that can 
only be described as “lose-lose.”
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